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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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TOP SECRET

17 February 1962

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DAILY BRIEF

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`25X1	Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200250001-5	
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25X1	British Guiana: The general strike, which began on 13 February, has almost paralyzed the capital city of Georgetown and on 16 February occasioned extensive violence, including several deaths. On 16 February, London sent about 600 troops from Jamaica and the United Kingdom in response to a plea from Premier Jagan to the governor for assistance in maintaining order.	
25>	leaders hope to force Jagan's resignation or to instigate enough defections from his present small majority in the legislature to defeat him there. Jagan in a broadcast on 16 February promised to cancel some of the proposed fiscal measures that	
25X ²	Regular security forces in the colony consist of a 1,500-man police force, 200 British troops, and a small national-guard-type volunteer force which has been ordered to stand by.	25X1
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*Portugal: Ambassador Elbrick reports his conviction that there is a profound lack of confidence in US policy on the part of high Portuguese officials. He believes that the imminence of negotiations for a renewal of the Azores base agreement is also contributing to current expressions of Portuguese "intransigence" regarding cooperation with the US. Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira told Elbrick on 13 February that US policy toward Portugal left no room for cooperation between the two countries and that there would 25X1 be no improvement unless there was a change in US policy-strongly implying that Lisbon will insist on extensive political concessions by the US before renewing the base agreement which expires at the end of this year.7 Portuguese government leaders appear to be convinced that the US wants to "take over" its African territories. Nogueira remarked that since Washington seemed to be trying to force Lisbon to capitulate on its African policies, the only course open to Portugal was to seek an alignment which would offer it protection--a statement interpreted by Elbrick as possibly indicating a greater degree of cooperation among the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, South Africa, and 25X1 Portugal. *France-Algeria: (A well-informed French source relayed to the US Embassy in Paris on 14 February indications from De Gaulle's entourage that a French-Algerian agreement might 25X1 be nearer than official statements have suggested. Arab sources in Geneva also are quoted by press reports on 16 February to the effect that an agreement is imminent in the "final round" of secret negotiations now taking place in Switzerland. Official announcement of the outcome of the current "final" round of talks would probably not be made public for some days in any case, however, because of the time required for ratification by the Algerian National Revolutionary Council (CNRA) 25X1 (Ambassador Walmsley in Tunis has noted no pessimism on the part of the provisional Algerian government (PAG) leaders7 DAILY BRIEF 17 Feb 62 iv

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25X1	there, and does not expect the CNRA, to which the accord will be referred by the PAG, to be an obstacle to ratification. According to a PAG official, as of 14 February preparations for convening the CNRA were complete, in anticipation of imminent signing of an agreement.
25X1	Despite its public disclaimers of any intention to attempt a coup in Algeria, there is evidence that the Secret Army Organization is continuing its preparations to vitiate an agreement (Backup, Page 2)
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25X	17 Feb 62 DAILY BRIEF v

*Dominican Republic: The Dominican Government late on 16 February informed the United States Embassy in Santo Domingo that according to its information leftists are planning further anti-US disorders similar to those of 15 February during which the US flag was burned. In order to prevent such disorders the government is considering an emergency decree and is arresting for deportation the pro-Castro Maximo Lopez Molina and about a dozen other extremists. This action will not only put a break on further anti-US demonstrations but will also be a factor for stability. Some important military officials have been irritated at what they believe to have been softness towards the leftists on the part of the government.

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The French-Algerian Negotiations	25X1
Numerous recent press are optimistic about	25X1
the prospects for rapid conclusion of an agreement and early announcement of a cease-fire.	25X1
tighter security meas-	20/(1
ures to be taken in both Algeria and France in preparation for a cease-fire announcement. Press reports refer to formal signature of a draft agreement in about 10 days.	
Ambassador Walmsley sees nothing surprising in the fact that the secret negotiating session which began last weekend	
has lasted longer than was apparently intended.	25X1
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Many members of the CNRA, possibly including former	I
premier Ferhat Abbas, have reportedly already arrived in Tunis. A four-fifths majority of the CNRA would be necessary to ratify	
any accord involving a cease-fire. Although there have been reports that some rebel military commanders are dissatisfied with	×.
the conduct of the negotiations, the PAG reportedly believes that quick ratification can be attained, but is prepared, if necessary,	
to present to the CNRA a strongly worded appeal from rebel vice premier Ben Bella and the other imprisoned ministers urging	
ratification.	
Timing of any announcement of a cease-fire and public signature of the accord will be a delicate problem for Paris. Although	1
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LFrench officials in Algeria now profess confidence in their ability to face whatever explosive reaction such announcements may produce, there are no indications that the OAS has weakened recently. There is recent evidence that exgeneral Salan, nominal head of the OAS, considers himself a prisoner of its more rabid elements, and this reinforces the likelihood that the OAS will attempt a violent reaction. In any case, the achievement of a cease-fire will not end the extremists' determination to reverse De Gaulle's policy.

Thousands of French troops in Algeria reportedly began moving on 16 February from the interior toward the cities of Algiers, Oran, and Bone, where European extremists have been particularly violent recently.]

According to US Consul General Porter in Algiers, few observers there expect any massive defection of army elements to the OAS, but some seem to think that a number of regiments or battalions would be brought over by defecting officers and that this would result in fighting between "loyalist" and "insurgent" units. The government in Paris reportedly believes that about one tenth of the approximately 60,000 harkis--Moslems serving with the French Army--and a "good percentage" of the approximately 16,000 Foreign Legionnaires may join the OAS guerrilla organization. A Foreign Legion regimental commander recently claimed to have warned his superiors that if there were any move to disband the Legion or transfer it to other French possessions, desertions to the OAS would be "general and widespread" and his own regiment would go over en masse. A French representative at the UN told US officials on 15 February that disposition of the Legion was causing problems and that Paris intended to send Legion battalions to a number of African states which have asked for them, presumably under joint defense arrangements with France?

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THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman

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The National Security Agency
The Director

The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director

The United States Information Agency

